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 Failure in the present paper concerns an act that did not take place and a person that 
did not fulfil her ‘ancient’ destiny. This is Antigone in Moira Buffini’s Welcome to Thebes 
(2010). The play is an adaptation of Sophocles’ tragedy.1 It is set in a ruined city, days after 
the end of a civil war. The women of Thebes, with Eurydice as their president elect, try to 
rebuild their city, but have to rely on the financial assistance of king Theseus of Athens. Like 
Creon, her ancient counterpart, Eurydice forbids the burial of Antigone’s brother, Polynices, 
and threatens to punish anyone who disobeys with death. Soon Theseus and his entourage 
arrive and seem to sympathise with the women’s plight. However, the visit comes to an 
abrupt end when a boy-solider is killed by Theseus’s bodyguards. As the Athenians prepare 
for a hasty retreat, the women’s hopes to resurrect their city dwindle. In the general 
commotion Antigone is caught by the guards in the act of burying her brother and is brought 
before Eurydice. Weary of death, Eurydice retracts the death sentence and orders Antigone to 
live. Antigone agrees.  
Two failures stand out in comparison with the Sophoclean play: Antigone’s failure to 
‘be’ Antigone, and the collapse of the social order of the polis, which creates a vacuum of 
values and principles. Lacan claims that Antigone’s appeal stems from her ‘No’ to Creon. At 
the same time, her suicidal determination to adhere to her duty to bury her brother puts her 
beyond human measure. The ‘splendour of Antigone’, which arises most distinctly with her 
final soliloquy, veils her inhuman character and mediates the spectator’s encounter with the 
death drive she embodies (Lacan 1992: 263). The two failures in the new play alter the fabric 
of the tragedy, transposing it in the realm of the lesser genre of tragedy of mixed reversals, or 
‘catastrophe survived’ (Burnett, 1970). Welcome to Thebes can therefore be read as it is, a 
contemporary play in its own right, and as it is not, ever-failing (deliberate) attempt to reach 
its ancient other.  
For Lacan the difference between classical and modern tragedy lies in the fact that the 
ancient hero has no choice but to act in the way she does. She is ‘guilty’ before her act, that 
is, bound to the necessity of repaying a debt she did not herself contract. In modernity guilt 
and debt are taken from us and ‘destiny no longer applies’ (Lacan in Zupančič, 2000: 172). 
The rupture between the old and the new tragedy is therefore subtended by a shift in the 
structure of desire, which, in psychoanalytic terms, always concerns the subject’s knowledge 
of the status of the Other. The Other in Lacanian psychoanalysis encompasses a range of 
meanings: the Mother, as first and lost object of love; the Father as representative of the 
separation from the mother after the dissolution of the Oedipus complex and as traditional 
figure of authority; language as the system of mediation and representation in which desire is 
spoken; difference; the social order (see Lemaire, 1991). Lacan regularly avoids specifying 
which particular aspect of the Other he employs, letting context and the resonances of the 
term determine the meaning. Below I will mostly be talking about the erosion of the Other in 
terms of authority, social order and system of differences.  
Lacan traces a line of such shifts from Oedipus, to Hamlet, to Claudel’s Sygne de 
Coûfontaine: Oedipus finds himself in a situation defined by lack of knowledge and follows a 
trajectory which leads to knowledge. In Hamlet the Other (the Father) knows (that he is dead) 
and lets the subject (Hamlet) know. The challenge for Hamlet is how to act or not act on that 
knowledge. Sygne, on the other hand, knows that the Other is dead but ‘finds herself in a 
situation where she must make the decision to act despite her knowledge’ (Zupančič, 2000: 
175). By the same token, Welcome to Thebes registers a contemporary subjective position, an 
attitude towards knowledge and the Other, which determine the scope of the success or 
failure of one’s acts.  
The reception of the play could be understood along similar lines. The Athenian 
spectators were expected to experience pity and fear during a performance and catharsis in 
the end. These emotions arose on the background of solid civic values which could absorb the 
shock of the events unfolding on stage.  Thus, by the end of the play, the threat to the polis – 
for instance, the pollution from Oedipus’s hamartia – was removed and order returned. But 
the contemporary Welcome to Thebes may not give rise to strong emotions. This is not simply 
because it is a ‘catastrophe survived’ but because, as Baudrillard suggests, we might have lost 
the capacity for such strong emotions.  
Baudrillard claims that contemporary culture might have entered a state of simulation, 
in which opposites collapse and difference gives way to similarity. He attributes this situation 
to a process of relentless metaphorisation, a mad sliding of meaning which stops at nothing. 
This is fuelled by the drive to eliminate death. The resulting life-affirmative attitude is deeply 
narcissistic and erodes notions of free will, choice, destiny and self-determination. Rather 
than being characterised by more freedom, more responsibility and more knowledge, our era 
is marked by a renunciation of all the above. Thus, Baudrillard argues, we may have entered 
a stage of cold epilepsy of history (2001: 73), in which we are no longer able to see, think and 
feel in depth but only in a very superficial manner. As a result, a potential failure to respond 
to Welcome to Thebes, or to see it as anything but the triumph of life over death, belies a third 
kind of failure, a potential failure of contemporary subjectivity and culture.  
In this paper I will consider the three failures as interrelated and dependent upon one 
another. First, I will focus on the structural shifts and the ontological conditions that the new 
play illuminates with its deliberate departure from the ancient drama. I do not consider 
theatre as mere sociological evidence or as a ‘faithful’ representation of contemporary 
subjectivity. I take it as capable of mobilising critical thought, opening up a potential realm in 
which (our) distance from the past meets the potentialities of the future. More important, I 
consider it as the realm in which the very possibility of critical thought is put to the test, to 
the extent that it is not just an inherent capacity but a function related to the prevailing mode 
of reflexivity in late modernity (see Žižek, 1999). My reading of Welcome to Thebes and of 
the possible reaction of the audience are therefore characterised by the desire to highlight 
potentialities. Inversely, it is characterised by a failure: a deliberate failure to reach ‘useful’ 
generalisations for the contemporary human condition. This epistemological decision is 
supported by the theoretical insights of Lacan and Baudrillard, who focus on the conditions 
of subjectivity as individuality, knowledge, seeing, thought and action, rather than on their 
value as ‘solutions’ for contemporary situations.  
Below I discuss the convergence of Lacan and Baudrillard, starting with on the notion 
of the Other and the emergence of the nothing/impossible exchange. I also propose a 
convergence based on the operation of seeing and vision which is particularly relevant to 
theatre. The theoretical part is followed by a discussion of Welcome to Thebes and an 
illustration of failure qua failure of individuality (Antigone) and the Other (the collective city 
of Thebes). Finally, I consider the extent to which failure to feel anxiety at the outcome of the 
play might indeed be taken as evidence of apathy or the Baudrillarian cold epilepsy.  
 Failure figures in both theories. Lacan considers the unconscious to be a failure 
(Lacan, 1991: 25), to the extent that it accommodates the aetiology of a symptom, the latter 
being an indication that something is out of place. The relationship between the subject and 
the Other is also marked by failure. For Lacan, entry to language and separation from the 
mother imply that the subject has no choice but to seek the satisfaction of their desire in the 
field of the Other. The pursuit of love objects or culturally validated objects normally serves 
that purpose. Thus, the subject usually finds its place in the Other without questioning the 
Other’s status. This means that the subject usually perceives the Other as capable of 
accommodating or fulfilling their desire; or is convinced that the Other ‘knows’ and hold the 
key to their desire; or that she herself has a special gift which is indispensable for the Other’s 
existence. In certain occasions, however, this ‘peaceful’ phantasmatic coexistence cannot be 
maintained. Then the subject must discover the limitations of the Other, its structural, 
inherent failure. Every act of knowledge and, inversely, every gesture of ignorance pivots on 
that truth. 
As indicated in the introduction, Lacanians claim that contemporary culture is marked 
by the erosion of the Name of the Father (Other) as the traditional guarantor of law and order. 
One therefore needs to come to terms with the contingency of the Other, that is, the inherent 
inconsistency and openness of the social and symbolic system. This is an essential condition 
of subjectivity.2 In that sense, Lacanians would claim that we all live in Thebes, finding our 
way in the ruins of the old world and trying to build a new one out of the leftover materials. 
A modicum of subjectivity and Otherness is always maintained. Lacan does not contemplate 
the total failure of subjectivity and Otherness, which would lead to psychosis. The significant 
moment for an individual is therefore the moment of coming to terms with the inconsistency 
of the Other which is both liberating, because no one ‘rules’ over the subject, and devastating, 
as one loses the safety net of a robust set of ideals. Reaching this point is often described as 
symbolic destitution (Žižek, 199: 59), a zero point of subjectivity and knowledge that 
interests us today.  
Baudrillard is also interested in the failure of the Other but as erosion of difference. 
As indicated above, he attributes it to the collective desire to evade death and secure one’s 
everlasting presence. Erosion of difference, in that sense, involves the irreparable 
destabilization of discreet opposites like ‘life’ and ‘death’. However, Baudrillard does not 
advocate a mere return to difference or a restitution of the Other. Instead of that, he invites us 
to think radically differently, along the lines of a reversal of causality: ‘it is the object that 
thinks us; it is the effect which causes us; it is language which speaks us; it is death which 
lies in wait for us’ (2001: 89). This radical way of thinking is pursued by challenging 
meaning via a direct attack on linking (Levin 1996: 26), undermining causal relations, 
dismantling consequence, upending order, and prioritising the object over the subject 
(Baudrillard 2001: 88-9). Baudrillard, notes Levin, questions the Hegelian subject-object 
dialectic ‘in which the outcome of the history of Spirit is no longer conceived as the triumph 
of the concrete universal, but as the squalid failure of transcendence and collapse into the 
abstract particular’ (1996: 26, emphasis added).  
For the individual the challenge is to understand the conditions of the erosion of 
meaning, reaching a point where the absurdity of the system becomes self-evident. For 
Baudrillard the problem starts with the social order. As the latter becomes more virtual and 
less dependent upon external reference, like a self-contained and perfect Other, we find it 
increasingly difficult to judge the truth of appearances. No external reference point can be 
established. Many traditional disciplines, like law, economics or humanism face up to the 
impossibility of external reference or grounding, what is also known as the impossible 
exchange. Likewise, individuals are faced with an impossible exchange when encountering 
the demise of higher values as a referent for their acts and decisions. Unable to ground their 
existence in anything else, they ‘turn in on themselves, demanding the right to be themselves, 
which according to Baudrillard, is the end of the self, the point at which the subject is lost’ 
(Heggarty 2004: 86).  
It is this narcissistic or self-referential turn that Baudrillard seeks to challenge via a 
process of knowing and seeing based on illuminating ‘the nothing’ and the ‘impossible 
exchange’ which prove the absurdity of the metaphorical sliding of meaning. This is a 
process of self-knowledge: ‘We do not know ourselves distinctly and clearly until the day we 
see ourselves from the outside as another’ (Baudrillard in Levin 1996: 32). This, of course, 
does not call for a naïve identification with the other, or adopting the other’s perspective as 
vantage point of view. It rather concerns the surprise of finding ourselves in the place of the 
other, or under similar limit conditions. Thus, stepping outside oneself constitutes a critical 
activity which not only brings ideology and culture/Other under scrutiny but challenges the 
‘I’ as the centre of thought and certainty. Heggarty notes that the point of view is not external 
to the subject: ‘Baudrillard has moved on from having this as a privileged ‘outside’, to a 
position where the ontological question of Being as presence (as) opposed to absence is 
being posed’ (2004: 45, emphasis added). For the subject, encountering the nothing and the 
impossible exchange has similar effects to facing one’s own relationship to the Other’s 
inconsistency. This convergence is explained below.  
In Lacan ([1953-54] 1988:124) we find a visual schema with mirrors that 
encompasses the complexity of how one sees oneself in the world, that is, in the field of the 
Other. Lacan proposes an arrangement in which an eye looks at a bouquet of flowers placed 
at some distance from a vase which is hidden inside a box. The insertion of a mirror creates 
the illusion that they are one item. In this visual metaphor the eye stands for the Cartesian 
cogito and the vase and flowers for the unified perception of real object and virtual ideas. The 
problem is that the eye cannot occupy the position of the ideal observer and is likely to 
appear among the flowers, as part of what the mirror reflects. The insertion of a second 
mirror, however, opens up a virtual space in which one can see the coherence and unity of the 
picture from a vantage point. Zupančič comments:  
what happens with the intervention of the second mirror is precisely what Kant describes as a 
‘dialectical illusion’…. The ‘I’ as a pure form of transcendental apperception transforms itself – via the 
notion of personality implied by this configuration – into an identity which appears as if it really held 
in the realm of what is… [the subject] cannot – if we pursue the visual metaphor – see himself seeing. 
The possibility of such a perspective opens up only with the concept of the regulative idea that 
constitutes precisely the virtual point of view with which the subject identifies in order to perceive this 
‘unity’ (2000: 74).  
Lacan contends that the emergence of the coherent and convincing image for the eye 
depends on the inclination of the mirror, which in turn depends on the symbolic connection 
between human beings (1988: 140, emphasis added). It follows, therefore, that we can 
envisage a situation in which symbolic connections fail, transcendental ideas fail, the mirror 
shifts and the inclination changes so much that it reflects nothing. I find the concept of the 
inclination of the mirror relevant to Baudrillard’s critical position. Too much inclination of 
the mirror – too much virtuality, for instance, or instability in human relations – frustrates the 
eye and exposes the virtuality of transcendental ideas and the certainty of the ego. The eye, 
which could have appeared as sovereign and external to the visual arrangement, is drawn into 
the scene. By the same token, the disruption of the scopic activity by the removal of the 
objects creates a sort of blindness, showing to the subject that it is only ever part of the 
arrangement. In that sense, Lacan seems to converge with Baudrillard who claims that the 
object and the world ‘thinks’ the subject rather than the other way round, casting serious 
doubt on the privileged exteriority of the thinking-observing-knowing subject.  
Baudrillard further comments on the function of seeing and knowing, drawing on the 
visual arts. In ‘Impossible Exchange’ (2001) he discusses the ‘Pigsty Installation’ in which 
the spectators look at a group of pigs while seeing themselves in a mirror doing that. Then, 
moving on, they reach ‘a two-way mirror through which they can once again see the pigs, but 
at the same time also see the spectators opposite looking at the pigs – spectators unaware, or 
at least pretending to be unaware, that they are being observed’ (2001: 107). This self- and 
other- scopic activity disrupts the illusion that one can observe unnoticed. At the same time, 
the experience of moving through the installation undermines the spectator’s uniqueness and, 
as in Lacan’s schema, shows that the sovereignty of the subject is only an effect of what is 
constituted ‘as scene’ (and seen) via a ‘dialectical illusion’.  
The full potential of this progressive movement of seeing is found in later Lacan. In 
The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis Lacan sums up the essential operation of 
drive as a tri-partite movement: to see, to be seen and to give oneself to be seen. With this 
movement, Lacan notes, a new subject appears (1991: 178). The Lacanian drive, a constant 
force which supports desire but remains partly outside the Other, reveals its radical potential 
to the extent that it is not subservient to culture. It engenders a subject which is not caught in 
the excitement of its own scopic capacity but capable of encountering what it means to reveal 
itself to its own and the other’s gaze, taking into account that it (subject) is just another 
element of a complex scene. This property of the drive, I argue, is conceptually very close to 
the contemplation of presence and absence as fundamental difference and the pursuit of the 
impossible exchange (see Voela, 2012). Both tend towards the limits of self-presence and the 
meaning of absence; both involve the realisation that the scene holds me in its gaze as much 
as I hold ‘it’ in my gaze. Failure to notice, to grasp the terms of the subject’s implication in 
its own world, is a failure of critical thought.  
 
The Ancient Greek language does not have a word for free will, at least in the sense of 
‘choice made with deliberation or an action accomplished of one’s own volition’ (Vernant 
and Vidal-Naquet 1990: 59). This is because the motivation of human acts lies in the hands of 
gods, in ate (fate), or is the consequences of deeds committed in the past and haunting the 
present. In Welcome to Thebes life-affirmative free will appears to prevail. Yet, it remains 
problematic, caught, as it is, in the mesh of destruction. This is signified by various erosions 
of meaning that undermine the frame of reference in which ‘life’ and ‘death’ are normally 
perceived as different.  
The first erosion occurs at the level of the collective social Other. In Ancient Greek 
drama the death of the hero marks the return to normality. In Welcome to Thebes, the city as 
symbolic order disintegrates. The women’s failure to secure Theseus’ help entails that the 
social fabric unravels. An opposing faction tries to woo Theseus and start a new civil war. 
When they fail, they approach Theseus’ enemy for help. The death of the young soldier by 
Theseus’ bodyguards goes unpunished, demonstrating the violence of power. When the 
delegation leaves, Ismeme, Antigone’s sister, tries to flee Thebes reneging on family values. 
Thus, the Other as system of symbolic values and unassailable laws appears bankrupt and 
failing. Faced with an ever unpredictable turn of events the Other re-acts, shifts and changes 
haphazardly, caught in a perpetual state of emergency and failing to ground itself in its own 
authority (Žižek 1999: 368).  
In Baudrillard’s terms, this Other implodes upon the dissolution of discreet values. 
The important point here is not to determine who might be responsible for that, but to see that 
the collapsing Other can no longer be the valid frame of reference for any person’s acts. In 
that sense, Antigone and others are free to do as they like in a vacuum of Otherness. The 
Other, already decimated and unstable, is indifferent to her act, sliding towards an internal 
logic of in-difference and deferral in the face of more pressing matters arising all the time. 
Thus, in-difference becomes the general context in which life and death substitute one 
another, the background of their (impossible) exchange.  
This is further shown when logos (speech) subsides. Language and authority are 
inextricably linked in psychoanalysis and classical thought, allowing subjectivity to come 
into being in one’s own words. In Welcome to Thebes logos withers. There is no agon (verbal 
contestation) between Eurydice and Antigone, as between Creon and Antigone. Instead of 
that, there is admission of defeat, pardon, solidarity and renunciation of the ‘heroic’ ethos. 
Eurydice sounds almost maternal in her admonitions:   
E: You see, the opposite to suffering, the opposite of great heroic destiny is a quiet ordinary 
life: to love. You’ve done enough for death, Antigone, you can retire from service I would 
say; Tiresias, please tell her she is free. (Buffini 2010: 88) 
There are a lot of references to blindness and seeing in the play. Eurydice can see her 
enemies scheming behind their back, while the mighty Theseus cannot see that calamity – his 
wife’s suicide – will soon befall his own house. One of the main characters is the blind seer 
Tiresias, who welcomes everyone ‘to the country of the blind’, exhorting people to see 
clearly. Haemon, Eurydice’s son, has lost his eyes during the war. He is in love with 
Antigone: ‘my images of you are now stuck in the past. I doubt I will see your face again, 
though I imagine it. Are you still there? (Buffini, 2010: 45). Ismene incites Antigone to see 
that if she buries their brother she will be helping Eurydice’s political opponents: ‘Can’t you 
see something more important going on?’, she asks, indicating that allegiance to the emerging 
democracy is the only duty. But Antigone is afraid of the dead who ‘see everything we do’ 
(2010: 30). At the same time, according to the women of Thebes, ‘dark matter’, a cosmic 
equivalent of blindness, threatens to envelop the world (2010: 55).  
In such circumstances Antigone feels the pressure of fate: ‘I lead the blind’ she says, 
alluding to escorting her father Oedipus into exile, ‘I bury the dead, I follow the path, I am 
Antigone’ (2010: 62). When Haemon asks her to marry him, Antigone feels the pressure of 
duty: ‘It’s coming, my destiny, swooping through the air, atoms heavy with intention’. But 
when she thinks that her act is turned against Eurydice, and is associated with the death of the 
young soldier, she thinks:  
A: I am fighting with the gods of death, they are above the ground, I’m trying to appease, to 
do as they require… I’ve fought with them, and begged, and now, they’re feeding on that boy. 
This is not, is not my destiny (2010: 80).  
And when confronted by Eurydice about the political implications of her act:  
A: Ismene thinks about the future all the time, and Haemon too. I’ve never understood their 
lack of fear. My future’s always been the desolate track I walked with my father, leading on 
ahead past rotting corpses and bloated dogs, through burning villages, through war. Oedipus 
saved the sight, But I saw my destiny, my destination, Death (2010:87).  
But then she hesitates she asks: ‘What’s to be done?’, to which Eurydice replies: 
‘There’s no such thing as destiny, there’s only change’ (2010: 88). Soon afterwards, Antigone 
seems to grasp the entire picture: the hopeless future of Thebes, the machinations of the 
opposition, the violence inherent in human nature, but also Haemon’s love and Eurydice’s 
commitment to democracy: ‘Ismene said: “Can you not see?”. I want to see what life is like, 
to live’ (2010: 96).  
The life affirmative choice arises as the only possible choice in a world saturated with 
death. A temporal dislocation is at work: it is not the past and the present that determine the 
subject but the future which comes their way with the force of an imminent disaster. Thus, 
the new tragic predicament is not how to deal with the burden of the past but how to be 
prepared for what is yet to be-come. It is this potentiality that marks the shift from the old to 
the new play.  
Formal similarities normally invite us to seek equivalences: although the new 
Antigone is but an ordinary girl, she has the same name, is in the same predicament and acts 
in the same manner as her ancient counterpart. But what is the criterion of being Antigone? Is 
it her act (burial-defiance-death) or does uniqueness lie elsewhere? Inevitably, comparison 
leads to the concept of ‘individuality’ and ‘free will’, for which there is little room in the old 
play. But reading Antigone with Baudrillard in mind shows how stretching ‘similarities’ to 
absurdity problematizes identity and difference as the bedrock of modern thought 
(Baudrillard 2001: 52). Opposites are undermined: life exchanged for death, seeing for 
blindness, and adherence to the laws of the dead for political allegiance. What is unclear, 
however, is whether we can legitimately equate literal living with metaphorical dying, taking 
the view that life in a destroyed city equals death. For Baudrillard this exchange proves the 
power of the unstoppable symbolic and metaphorical equivalences to which we might feel 
inclined to subscribe. At that point we are compelled to consider the influence of our own 
life-affirmative disposition which makes us see the point in erasing Antigone-the-inhuman by 
reintroducing her in a (metaphorical) circuit of a meaningful and justifiable desire to live.  
The emphasis on seeing and blindness highlights the subject’s attempt to see herself 
in the bigger scheme of things, contemplating her own presence and absence in the failing 
Other. It resonates, of course, with Oedipus’s blindness, and the latter becomes an important 
point of reference for the new play. However, freedom, choice, destiny and the ability ‘to see’ 
are not to be understood with reference to the burden Oedipus bequeathes his children, but 
with reference to his act and his process of knowing. This is explained below.  
In psychoanalytic terms the notion of freedom involves a paradigmatic shift from the 
pathological to the ethical. The latter concerns the disengagement from the desire of the 
Other and a ‘correction’ of the subject’s attitude towards it. Freedom does not mean feeling 
suddenly independent or indifferent towards the Other. It strikes a balance between the lack 
of options, the fact that ‘I couldn’t do anything else’, and the fact that ‘I was carried along’ by 
the stream of natural necessity. Paradoxically, it is at the very moment, when the subject is 
conscious of being carried along by the stream of natural necessity, that she also becomes 
aware of her freedom (Zupančič 2000: 27). Thus, when an obligation is given up as ‘not 
worth it’, it becomes an ethical act only if the subject has already passed through and 
abandoned the lack of the Other, appreciating the importance of causal determination but not 
falling victim to it. This is what the new Antigone does, when she recognises her obligation 
towards her family but also the fact that she does not need to die for that cause. This is how 
she is carried by the tide of necessity, which Eurydice aptly calls change. Therefore, her act is 
not an act of passive compliance with destiny but an act of freedom to the extent that it 
subscribes neither to the foretold destiny of death, nor to the idea of propping up the 
collapsing order of Thebes (contingent Other). At that moment the subject is her own cause. 
Thus, the statement ‘this is not my fate’, implies that she cannot see herself either in the old 
or the new order. This rather impossible and lonely position of subjective destitution, chimes 
with the Baudrillardian perspective of seeing from a perspective that allows the subject to 
contemplate their presence and absence. At that crucial moment, the subject encounters both 
her own and the Other’s presence or absence, their individual and collective blindness and 
demise.  
Psychoanalysis elaborates on this point: from that ex-centric perspective, the subject 
rediscovers the possibility of choice. This ‘empty place’, from which one speaks – again 
resonating with Baudrillard’s seeing as other – shows that behind this choice there is nothing, 
no ‘meta-foundation’ of freedom’ (Zupančič, 2000: 37). The relation to the Other is therefore 
altered and the ethical act is made possible: ‘the subject of freedom is indeed the effect of the 
Other, but not in the sense of being an effect of some cause that exists in the Other. Instead, 
the subject is the effect of the fact that there is a cause which will never be discovered in the 
Other’ (Zupančič, 2000: 41), that is, she is the failure of cause.  
The difference between the classical heroes Oedipus and Antigone is relevant at this 
point: Oedipus starts from a position of ignorance and initiates the pursuit of truth by 
committing to it verbally. One’s word therefore is the little ‘something’ in exchange of which 
the subject enters the game of truth without yet knowing its consequences (Zupančič, 2000: 
203). By the end of the play Oedipus arrives at (self)knowledge, finding himself to be the 
object of his inquiry. Unlike Oedipus, who does not know, Antigone already knows the law 
and power she opposes and her act stems from knowledge. Moreover, it is an act of fidelity to 
the family ate which repeats and settles the past. In Welcome to Thebes the new Antigone 
moves from knowledge (of destiny) to not knowing (being unable to see herself in the world), 
comparable to Oedipal ignorance. This knowledge allows her not only to separate herself 
from her past but to commit verbally to the future (‘I want to see what life is like, to live’). 
Choice from that perspective, as commitment to future truth and knowledge, evokes both the 
act of her ancient counterpart, who repeats the paternal past, and that of Oedipus. It is 
therefore caught between two replications/repetitions: seeing like the other (Antigone) and 
failing to see like the other (Oedipus). But her uniqueness is her difference: it lies in being or 
becoming neither, embodying the impossible choice between life and death, knowledge and 
non-knowledge, past and present. The new Antigone therefore hovers in the realm of the 
impossible exchange, having seen as other and having seen nothing. There is perhaps another 
contemporary shift that we need to take into account, the interminable oscillation between 
opposites, which is neither the collapse of difference, nor its proper recuperation in a new 
meaning. In that sense, the failure of both points towards a universe full of Baudrillarian 
irony: countless reversals, seductive similarities, in-determinations and im-possibilities which 
contribute to an incessant migration of ignorance and the rise of nothing.  
 
Below I will consider the spectators’ engagement with the play in terms of meaning 
and affect. I will focus on the ending and the gradual emptying of the scene. This rather 
conventional theatrical device takes on special significance in the context of the two failures 
discussed above. The departure of the Athenians, the exit of the women of Thebes, the 
departure of the soldiers and the symbolic departure of Antigone at the start of a new life, 
create the impression that ‘nothing happened’, where something ought to have taken place.  
Borrowing the mirror arrangement of seeing and transcendental ideas from Lacan and 
the movement through the Pigsty Installation from Baudrillard, we can argue that the 
spectator of Welcome to Thebes undergoes a similar scopic experience: from seeing and 
observing the unfolding action, to witnessing the advent of nothing, the ‘emptying’ of the 
scene. The conditions for an impossible exchange arises at this point: a demand for a final 
settlement which seeks to exchange the ‘nothing’ for ‘something’, to make sense and recoup 
some value for the vacuity in front of us.  
Let us dwell on the moment in terms of meaning and affect. Meaning may be 
established if one thinks backwards, in retrospect, and in a manner similar to the 
psychoanalytic interpretation of the past: what we were seeing was nothing – the gradual 
collapse of the social and subjectivity. What we were looking at was objects gradually 
moving out of sight. In that sense, the nothing we encounter clearly at the end of the play is 
but a repetition, the advent of our (the individual’s) deceptive distance and vanishing from 
the (social) scene, the delay of which enabled us to catch a glimpse of ourselves as proper 
individuals for a while. A new kind of knowledge arises at that point as one considers one’s 
place in the scene: I am the drive, a nothing supporting desire, catching a glimpse of my dis-
placement in the trajectory of events, being dis-located in a scene (not a screen) appearing 
before my eyes as that which implicates and contains me in its structure. If the world around 
me collapses, I cannot be watching unaffected. I am therefore forced to contemplate my own 
elision alongside the contingency of the Other, my presence and absence, my life and death, 
my success and failure.  
These thoughts may give rise to anxiety. In psychoanalytic terms, anxiety is the 
affective equivalent of meaning being annihilated3 (Verhaeghe 2001), as nothing appears in 
its place. Anxiety therefore emerges as the new possible tragic affect. The reverse, failure to 
feel, would mean that we are probably already locked in an endless circulation of images, in a 
metaphorical pigsty of stagnant, repeated significations. Failure to feel means that we are 
content to reach a happy ending, and a blindness concerning our own presence and absence in 
a spectacle which we refuse to consider as anything but an object of enjoyment.   
In Lacanian terms one would have to ask: is there another hope or another choice at 
that very moment, when it becomes obvious that the tragic feeling of the play relies heavily 
on the movement of the drive which can sustain/deny the endless circulation of meaning? Are 
we supposed to revel in our condition, affirming our elision, lack or aphanisis, and turning to 
a being-for death, like the ancient Antigone? Or do we catch ourselves thinking that a death is 
required – Antigone’s new death – to restored order and good sense to the world? Are we 
nostalgic for a death that justifies and supports order? Choice at this point would call for 
separation in the psychoanalytic sense of the term, the necessity of reintroducing some 
symbolic difference and some binary opposition – a modicum of Otherness. For Baudrillard it 
is perhaps enough to have reached the point of impossible exchange, and with it the anxiety 
of presence/absence. Ultimately, therefore, the question of success or failure rest on whether 
subjects can still experience the impossible exchange and, with it , their own ‘death’ before 
the automatic ‘reflex’ of life disrupts the process. Failure to do so means that we have already 
passed into a state of cold epilepsy, into an affectless indifference to ‘life’ and ‘death’ as 
significant opposites.  
 For those who seek to attribute meaning to the nothing in front of their eyes, the secret 
according to Baudrillard is not to seek to explain it but to see differently: to come to terms 
with the object and the world, not simply as failing Other but as that which thinks and 
contains me in its complex arrangements. Theatre lends itself to this operation as play of 
forms which still evoke traditional opposites and may successfully hold on to the last 
important obstacle to total simulation: the impossible exchange between ‘nothing’ and 
‘something’:  
Duality no longer has a credible content for us, except in art, entertainment and the politics of 
race and gender, which are remnants of traditional morality in the modern age… [dualism] 
has been almost entirely reduced to the abstract, formal or diacritical differences between on 
off, true false, public private, present absent… the actual content of culture has been reduced 
to an endless continuum of equivalent(s). (Levin 1996, p. 91)  
If theatre still maintains that formal property, then the juxtaposition of old and new forms of 
tragedy might be producing enough dissonance and dislocation to enable us to think the 
future and the present. In Lacanian terms, the anxiety-provoking knowledge arising at this 
point suggests that the permissible point of view is one of failure and renunciation of 
mastery: knowing nothing, staying stupid, as Nobus and Quinn (2005) put it, regarding the 
essence of the psychoanalytic epistemology. In that sense, a certain failure is always required 
for things to start and success should never be measures in terms of gain but by the disruptive 
effectiveness of the entire experience. Ultimately therefore, it is the impossibility of 
exchanging affect (anxiety) or the nothing for a secure and life-enhancing knowledge that 
differentiates both the Lacanian and Baudrillarian endeavour from the pursuit of 
commodified enjoyment.  
But is this good enough? Baudrillard, for whom radical thought is important, remains 
ambivalent. Perhaps we are still capable of radical thought; perhaps we have simply 
developed a tragic vision which always returns us to the same old predicament: it cannot be 
exchanged for anything, least of all for a different or better life. We therefore find ourselves 
in the same position as the new Antigone: intellectually alive in an indifferent, disintegrating 
universe. Yet, the possibility of such a useless mode of thought imbues Baudrillard’s thought 
(see 2001:40-44) and allows a last hope, a positive failure which should spread in every 
direction, a viable radical alternative to the compromised postmodern reflexivity which has 
produced narcissistic and self-centred individualism.  
Theatre can play an important role in this endeavour, provided that it avoids the 
endless proliferation of meaningless meanings, demonstrating that there is no logical 
resolution, ‘only a logical exacerbation and a catastrophic resolution’ (2004: 84). This, notes 
Baudrillard, is the appropriate strategy: returning to the system its own logic by doubling it, 
reflecting it, ‘like a mirror without absorbing it’ (2004: 85, emphasis added), a mirror, we 
might propose, which reflects nothing. Failure to be Antigone, failure of the Other, failure to 
exchange nothing for something; hovering at the edge of failure, always repeating it in abject, 
tragic clarity.   
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3. In psychoanalysis the process of symbolic interpretation is often accompanied by a feeling of anxiety, due to 
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